Philosophical questions of identity

Philosophical questions of identity

Philosophical questions of identity

One of the biggest questions in modern philosophy concerns the abstraction of ‘identity’. Famous academics such as Bertrand Russell, John Locke and Sam Miller have étendu pondered what it is that makes someone exclusif and the qualities that go to make up the ‘soul’ and mind.

“Who am I,” is a tracas that has troubled philosophers for centuries. Miller, in the late 1800s, hypothesized that the spirit was what set him apart from others. As he was aware of the decay of the human casaque over time, he hypothesized that there must be something emboîture himself and others that was consistent across time and space.

While trying to comfort a dying friend, Gretchen Weirobe, he claimed that he believed that the soul must be at the core of identity and that there must be a life after death parce que the soul is not governed by time.

Weirob, by refutation, developed one of the most famous counter-arguments to the ‘soul’ hypothesis of identity. He claimed:

(1) If the identity of people lies in their incorporeal and unobservable souls, when we judge others, we are in fact judging their incorporeal and unobservable souls.

(2) If such judgments are emboîture immaterial and immaterial souls, they will be baseless and baseless.

(3) People’s judgments of others are not always baseless and baseless.

(4) We must not judge organic and véritable souls.

(5) A soul which does not make a person.

Similarly, John Locke disagreed with Miller’s assumption of the soul, arguing instead that one’s identity was held within their consciousness, specifically memories. Bicause memories were an neutre experience that was entirely exclusif to a particular individual and were not subject to réformé over time, Locke assumed that this was where one’s identity was found.

(1) A person considered at one bilan in time is considered the same person at a different bilan in time, if and only if they have the same memory.

However, Locke faced the problem of people who forget memories. For example, according to Locke’s prototype hypothesis, a child and a gréement adult would be different creatures, parce que they would not share the same memories as adults would struggle to remember life at two years old.

Therefore, Locke revised his memory hypothesis as follows:

(1) A person considered at one bilan in time is one and the same person as a person considered at another bilan in time, if and only if there is an overlapping chain of memories connected to them.

Thus an old man is the same person as himself at thirty, the same person at fifteen, the same person at eight, and so on. The overlapping chain of memories is a sufficient requirement to indicate sameness between entities and to satisfy Locke’s questions emboîture the abstraction of identity.

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